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ABSTRACT—The ability to flexibly predict others’ behaviors
has been ascribed to a theory of mind (ToM) system. Most
research has focused on formal conceptual definitions of
such a system, and the question of whom to credit with a
ToM. In this article, I suggest shifting perspective from
formal definitions to a usage-based approach. This
approach views action within human interaction as cen-
tral to the emergence and continuous development of the
ability to flexibly predict others’ behaviors. Addressing the
current debate about whether infants have a ToM, I illus-
trate how infants use flexible action expectations to
interact with others appropriately. I also discuss the con-
tinuous development of ToM and its natural structure from
a usage-based perspective.
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THEORY OF MIND: WHAT FOR?
Theory of mind (ToM) is a cognitive system that “can be used to
make predictions about the behavior of others” (Premack &
Woodruff, 1978, p. 515). The system not only associates familiar
behavioral sequences but flexibly predicts novel sequences.
Flexibility is apparent when predicting unfamiliar and especially
mistaken actions (Dennett, 1978). Predictions of flexible behav-
ior in human adults and some primate species, although not in
human infants or other animal species, may be guided by a sys-
tem of internal theory-like rules—like internal rules that guide
flexible language use—that may enable inferences about others’
unobservable mental states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
The initial focus on what ToM is for—that is, predicting oth-
ers’ behaviors—shifted to what ToM is, that is, what concepts it
involves and what evidence constitutes a formally defined ToM.
A conceptual understanding of others’ mental states, especially
false beliefs, has become a defining core of ToM. The focus on
mental-state inferences has led to investigating a formal ToM, in
particular the formal aspects of false belief and other theory-
internal concepts, like propositional attitudes, normativity, cau-
sality, and abductive inferences (see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009;
Rakoczy, 2012). Other mental-state concepts, like intentions,
desire, and knowledge, are considered precursors to a full, rep-
resentational ToM (e.g., Wellman & Liu, 2004), but these still
follow the logic of formal conceptual definitions of ToM.
One problem with formal conceptual approaches is that the
postulated definitions of ToM and their empirical operationaliza-
tions influence each other. The validity of the widely used stan-
dard false belief tests has been questioned because additional
task demands like language and executive skills conceal con-
ceptual understanding (Bloom & German, 2000). When remov-
ing these demands, apparently even 1-year-olds understand
false belief (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010). For other research-
ers, however, the very conceptual definitions require some of the
removed demands, such as language to entail hypothetical—not
only practical—belief scenarios (Perner, 2010), executive skills
to enable flexibility in perspective shifting (e.g., Moses, Carlson,
& Sabbagh, 2005), or other general reasoning skills to get from
premises to conclusions. This results in the ambiguous use of
the term ToM (Rakoczy, 2012) and leads to auxiliary terms
like infant ToM and the postulation of separate ToM systems
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).
A second problem is that formal approaches bewitch us to con-
ceptualize ToM as a stage-like all-or-nothing affair, obscuring
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the natural and continuous development of ToM from birth
throughout life. On one end of the developmental continuum, it
remains unclear how one gets from simple to complex, for exam-
ple, from newborn reactions to complex ascriptions of hypotheti-
cal false belief. Some researchers have invoked processes of
conceptual growth (e.g., Wellman & Liu, 2004), but it is unclear
how even a single mental-state concept is acquired, and how or
why concepts change over development (e.g., German & Leslie,
2000). Others have postulated an innate belief-tracking system
(Leslie, 1994), or evolutionarily inherited intention-reading
skills shared with nonhuman primates (Tomasello, 2008). How-
ever, although some cognitive processes are certainly biological
adaptations, we should not assume that newborns understand
false belief or other mental states (given the optimal tests) right
away or after some period of maturation. On the other end of the
continuum, understanding others’ behavior still develops after
the conceptual ToM watershed of false belief understanding,
enabling individuals to use irony, sarcasm, lying (e.g., Evans &
Lee, 2011; Winner et al., 1987), and other complex discourse.
Individual differences in social understanding and behavior are
apparent at school age (Hughes, 2011), and presumably some
people develop a better social understanding than others. How-
ever, it is unclear what advanced ToM concepts other than false
belief underlie advanced forms of social understanding (see
Apperly, 2012). Developmentally, a formal ToM is thus too
broad to begin with and too narrow to end.
TOM: A USAGE-BASED APPROACH
To understand how ToM is “used to make predictions about the
behavior of others” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 515), how
this use develops, and what the structure of the system looks
like, we need a usage-based approach. Usage-based approaches
to language provide a model (see Box 1). In parallel to language
theories, ToM has been conceptualized as a cognitive system
that applies internal rules (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). Just
what these rules are and how they emerge has been debated
over the past 30 years (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Baillargeon
et al., 2010; Leslie, 1994; Perner, 2010). At the same time,
usage-based approaches to language have argued that no lan-
guage-specific system exists that applies internal rules but that
linguistic rules are symbolic constructions that arise from
patterns of symbol use (see Box 1). Similarly, the problem with
formal approaches to ToM is that they center on abstract
concepts as the core of ToM and view the actions they predict
as peripheral. But to understand the natural structure and devel-
opment of ToM requires turning away from formal conceptual
definitions and focusing on the natural use of ToM as a system
for action predictions.
Human beings are ultra social and biologically adapted to
cooperatively interact and communicate with each other (Toma-
sello, 2008). Monitoring others’ actions is essential to interact-
ing, and action predictions enable rapid and successful
interactions and communication. Thus, action expectations
within interaction are central to ToM. Through the use of more
complex actions within interaction, including linguistic interac-
tions, the web of expectations becomes more complex and
abstracted. The usage-based approach abandons a discrete all-
or-none perspective and assumes continuous development of the
action prediction system within interaction (for related views,
see Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Reddy, 2008). The goal of this
approach is to reveal the natural structure of ToM as a system
that enables action predictions within interaction and to account
for its development through its interactive use.
Do infants have a ToM? Answering this question depends
entirely on the formal definitions of ToM (Rakoczy, 2012). From
a usage-based perspective, the question is how infants use a
ToM system and how this use emerges. In the following section,
I review infants’ flexible use of action expectations in interactive
situations. Next, I defend the idea that competence in language-
mediated tasks does not cause the ability to flexibly predict
others’ behaviors. Instead, such competence results from metain-
teractional discourse about others’ behaviors. I then discuss the
structure of such a system.
ToM Use in Infancy
Experimental studies of infants’ interactions reveal that infants
have flexible expectations about the behaviors of those with
BOX 1
USAGE-BASED APPROACHES TO LANGUAGE: A
MODEL FOR TOM RESEARCH
Formal approaches to language focus on a core structure of
abstract algebraic rules (grammar) and treat symbolic meaning
(words) as variables at the periphery. In contrast, usage-based
approaches view the use of symbols as central (Tomasello, 2003).
Through their natural use, symbols are combined in specific ways
and result in linguistic constructions. These constructions are not
empty algebraic rules but meaningful symbolic patterns. Core and
periphery blend in a continuum of symbolic complexity. The
acquisition of grammar becomes much less impenetrable than by
conceptual definitions, which are deemed “theory-internal
affairs” (Tomasello, 2003, p. 7).
Formal approaches to theory of mind (ToM) focus on a core set of
mental-state concepts (ultimately, false belief). Simple
expectations about action sequences are considered peripheral
and excluded from the real thing or treated as a separate system.
The usage-based approach to ToM views action expectations
within interaction as central and proposes a continuum that
ranges from predicting simple to complex action sequences. It
aims at dissolving artificial dichotomies and avoiding “theory-
internal affairs” (Tomasello, 2003, p. 7) by assuming continuous
development and emerging structure from usage.
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whom they interact that depend on the other person and the sit-
uations within which the interaction occurs.
Infants react flexibly to another person’s behavior, reflecting
different expectations about the same action depending on the
social context. For example, when an adult ambiguously
requests one of several objects, 12- to 18-month-olds expect the
request to refer to the object with which the adult has not yet
interacted and offer the object that is new to her (Moll & Toma-
sello, 2007). However, when the adult has interacted with all of
the objects, but with one in a special way, infants expect that
her ambiguous request now refers to the object that is most
familiar to her. In contrast, when another adult who has not
interacted with that object in a special way now makes an
ambiguous request, infants have no expectation about the new
person’s reference and simply offer the objects randomly (Moll,
Richter, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008).
Parallel findings occur when 12-month-olds observe an adult
searching for something. When two objects have disappeared,
infants help the searching adult by pointing to the object with
which he was interacting, reflecting the expectation that he
wants to find the object he has interacted with (Liszkowski,
Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006). When he has interacted
with the objects equally, infants point to the object for which
the adult does not know its location, reflecting the expectation
that he needs information to find the object (Liszkowski, Carpen-
ter, & Tomasello, 2008).
Finally, when an adult points to one of two opaque boxes,
each containing a toy, 17-month-olds offer her that toy, inter-
preting her pointing to mean that she wants the toy in that box.
However, when the adult has not seen that the objects in the
boxes have been swapped, infants respond to her pointing by
offering the toy that is now in the other box (Southgate, Cheval-
lier, & Csibra, 2009). Similarly, when an adult tries to open an
empty box, infants help him open the empty box. But when the
adult has not seen that his toy has been moved to another box,
18-month-olds now open the other box (Buttelmann, Carpenter,
& Tomasello, 2009). In each of these cases, infants’ response to
another person’s behavior varies depending on their expecta-
tions about that person’s behavior.
Infants also initiate interactions flexibly, depending on their
expectations about others’ reactions. When 12-month-olds point
to interesting events, they expect a recipient to look at and com-
ment on these events. When the adult does not look at the
events or does not comment on them, infants point again to get
the expected reaction (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano,
& Tomasello, 2004). When the adult emotes positively about the
events, infants expect him to be interested in these events and
keep pointing on further occasions. However, when the adult
emotes neutrally about the events, infants stop pointing because
they expect him not to be interested in further events (Liszkow-
ski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007).
Infants’ expectations are also revealed in a request paradigm
(Liszkowski, Sch€afer, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009). Infants
were familiarized with specific places for toys and undesirable
objects. When infants got the chance to request the toys, the
places were empty. Unlike chimpanzees in the same paradigm,
infants spontaneously pointed to an empty place, apparently
expecting it would spur the adult to retrieve more toys, although
they did not directly point at any toys.
Infants even intervene proactively by anticipating others’ mis-
takes. In one study, an adult removed an aversive object to
avoid bumping into it when reaching around a barrier (Knudsen
& Liszkowski, 2012a). In her absence, another adult replaced
the aversive object. When the first adult returned, 12- and
18-month-olds spontaneously warned her by pointing to the
aversive object before she mistakenly reached for it. However,
when the object was not aversive or when the adult had
witnessed the replacement, infants pointed significantly less in
the otherwise identical situations.
In another study (Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2012b), an adult
searched for, and found, an object in one of several containers.
When she left the scene, another adult hid the object in another
container. When the first adult returned, before she mistakenly
approached the wrong container, 18- and 24-month-olds pointed
to the correct container. In contrast, infants pointed significantly
less when the adult had found the object only accidentally
(while cleaning containers) or had searched for the object but
seen the location switched. A follow-up study clarified that
18-month-olds intervened because they expected the adult to
approach the wrong container (Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2011).
When the adult returned, infants warned her selectively about
that box (which together with an alternative box had been baited
with aversive material). However, when the adult had seen the
toy being removed and then approached the boxes, infants
warned her equally about both boxes.
These diverse paradigms demonstrate that infants respond to
and initiate interactions flexibly. Infants form different
expectations about one and the same action, depending on the
situation and the person interacting with them, and they tailor
their communication to the specifics of the situation and person,
including intervening proactively. The experimental situations
are analogous to verbal tasks tapping into mental-state concepts
like ignorance, knowledge, or false belief. But they reveal a
direct usage in actions, not in conversations about others’
actions.
Development of ToM Use
The usage-based approach holds not just that ToM is used in
interaction, but that interactional experience drives the emer-
gence and development of the system that predicts actions.
Nativist accounts assume that early ToM competences are
masked by performance limitations, but they make no predic-
tions about their social-interactional origins (e.g., Baillargeon
et al., 2010). The usage-based approach instead assumes that
competence derives from performance. If infants’ competences
were neither employed in interaction nor derived from it, this
Child Development Perspectives, Volume 7, Number 2, 2013, Pages 104–109
106 Ulf Liszkowski
would severely weaken the usage-based approach. One recent
study suggests that 7-month-olds have a ToM (Kovacs, Teglas,
& Endress, 2010). However, that study tested object expecta-
tions as a function of whether someone had attended to objects;
it did not test predictions about others’ behaviors. Furthermore,
the origins of these skills are unknown.
The usage-based approach predicts that infants’ meaningful
preverbal interactions and expectations in their second year rest
on earlier interactional experiences and expectations. Indeed,
research shows that infants develop expectations about others’
behaviors in the 1st year of life. For example, 6-month-olds
expect gaze in interactional contexts to be directed at objects
(Senju & Csibra, 2008). Around the same age, infants expect
actions to be directed at objects (Woodward, 1998). Eight-
month-olds who refrain from reaching for distal objects reach
when someone else sits next to them, suggesting that they expect
others to assist their object-directed actions (Ramenzoni & Lisz-
kowski, 2012). Less is known about the mediating influence of
the social environment on the development of expectations, but
two studies suggest that social-interactional experience plays a
role from early on. First, 8- to 15-month-olds began to point ear-
lier and more often the more they were exposed to triadic social
interactions in their social-cultural settings (Salomo & Liszkow-
ski, 2012). Second, 10-month-olds from social-cultural settings
with more triadic interactions were more susceptible to commu-
nicatively induced search errors on the classic AnotB task than
10-month-olds from social-cultural settings with less triadic
interactions (Liszkowski & Zunino, 2012). These findings call
on us to unravel how early social-interactional experience
affects infants’ interactions and developing expectations.
Infants’ ToM skills continue to develop through further inter-
action, notably through the interactive use of language. Lan-
guage competence leads to success on standard false belief
tasks, but communicating about others’ actions first and foremost
reflects children’s conversational use of mental-state language
(Ensor & Hughes, 2008). Communicating about others’ actions
introduces others’ behaviors and folk explanations of that behav-
ior as a topic of conversation (Meins et al., 2002). These conver-
sations become meaningful to children against the backdrop of
preexisting ToM skills (Clements, Rustin, & McCallum, 2000),
with some indication that parents attune their mental-state talk
to their infants’ developing social skills (Slaughter, Peterson, &
Carpenter, 2009). Thus, language does not give rise to the abil-
ity to predict others’ mistaken actions (cf. San Juan & Astington,
2012); language enables individuals to converse about others’
actions. Mental-state talk thus introduces a new use of ToM for
hypothetical thought scenarios in which one infers and
expresses linguistically coded assumptions about others’ behav-
ior (as required to pass classic false belief tasks).
Development does not stop with successful performance on
false-belief tasks. The usage-based account predicts continuous
development of action predictions through continuous social
interaction. For example, increasing social complexities lead to
increasing social understanding (Hughes, 2011). Furthermore,
the pragmatic use of language augments ToM development. Par-
ticipating in more elaborate and complex discourse requires pre-
dicting and understanding more complex conversational moves,
including the appropriate use of lying, irony, sarcasm, and the
many more uses of linguistic actions within socially complex sit-
uations (e.g., bargaining, negotiating, arguing, and counseling).
ToM Structure
Usage-based theory holds that language structure consists of a
structured inventory of linguistic constructions. Analogously,
ToM structure can be seen as a structured inventory of action
sequences, including linguistic actions as a form of acting.
Action sequences are initially identified through pattern finding
(e.g., Saylor, Baldwin, Baird, & LaBounty, 2007) and qualified
by accompanying social-contextual information. Regularities
within action sequences and social-contextual information lead
to abstracted expectations of one about the other. This mental
web of abstracted expectations allows for predictions of unfamil-
iar and mistaken actions. It also extends to action expectations
about third parties with whom one is not interacting directly
(e.g., Fawcett & Liszkowski, 2012). On this view, ToM does not
consist of abstract concepts—instead, the interactive use of
action predictions leads to a gradually abstracted inventory of
action-context relations.
Developmentally, the system begins at 2–3 months when
infants engage in dyadic face-to-face interactions that arise from
an initial ability to detect contingencies within interaction
(Gergely & Watson, 1999). Object-directed expectations of
actions emerge a few months later, possibly through inter-
actional experience, with some indication that these skills are
evolutionarily shared with nonhuman primates (Tomasello,
2008). Around the same time, infants’ attentional system
becomes biased to social cueing (e.g., by the presence and
specifically the gaze of a social agent). This provides the system
with the relevant social-contextual information of actions. The
system links the actions to the relevant social information of the
contexts, allowing for predictions about others’ goals and
information.
THE CURRENT PERSPECTIVE
Cognitive systems exist for a purpose. I have followed the origi-
nal proposal that ToM is used to “make predictions about the
behavior of others” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, p. 515). These
predictions must be flexible because humans act in flexible
ways. However, we do not need to assume that humans start
out with a preconfigured system with internal rules (Perner,
2010) or representational capacities (Baillargeon et al., 2010;
Leslie, 1994), or that the system consists of abstract ToM con-
cepts developing one after another until a full ToM has
emerged (e.g., Wellman & Liu, 2004). In adopting a usage-
based perspective, I have briefly outlined a cognitive system
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that starts with simple action expectations arising from contin-
gent interactions, becomes gradually abstracted through
practice within interaction, and eventually leads to predictions
encompassing the hierarchical structure of actions and social
contexts and to conversations about these predictions in terms
of mental states.
Amid debates about the scope of ToM in infants, adults, or
nonhuman primates, the issue is not who has (or does not have)
a ToM, but how a ToM system is used, how that use develops,
and how it is structured naturally. Infants in their 2nd year of
life flexibly employ expectations about others’ behaviors to inter-
act with them appropriately, before they become competent
language users and long before they pass traditional ToM tests.
Verbal ToM tests are different; they test ToM use in conversa-
tions about behavior. Conversations, and their internalized use,
enable one to engage offline in hypothetical scenarios about oth-
ers’ actions. But they are not causal in enabling online predic-
tions of others’ behavior. More evidence is needed to reveal the
developmental process, but social-interactional experience plays
a role in the 1st year and throughout life. Crucially, the use of
language expands the scope of ToM to online predictions about
linguistic discourse actions. As social life and linguistic dis-
course become more complex, so too does our system for
predicting others’ behavioral attitudes and conversational moves.
In contrast to accounts invoking endpoints of conceptual devel-
opment, the usage-based approach assumes an open system with
gradual, continuous development across life in which new inter-
actional experience leads to new expectations and abstractions
about others’ behaviors.
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